RigoBlock Missing Access Controls

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RigoBlock

RigoBlock had an exploit on their smart contract hot wallet, where the access controls had not been set up properly. The protocol was exploited and 160.86 ETH was taken. The attacker later returned 90% of the funds, keeping the remaining 10% as a bounty. The returned funds are anticipated to be redistributed to affected users.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

About RigoBlock

"Organizing the World’s Value. RigoBlock is an open protocol that makes token management universally accessible." "RigoBlock describes itself as an open standard for asset/token management built on existing blockchains. It was founded in 2016 by Gabriele Rigo in Lugano, Switzerland. It has been live since November 2018 on the Ethereum main network."

"RigoBlock is a blockchain protocol that makes it possible for anyone to set up and run a digital token pool. It is an open protocol which developers can use for building their own applications for token management."

"On February 17, 2022 RigoBlock lost $464K due to the missing access control on a function controlling token allowances." "RigoBlock has been hacked. All tokens in Dragos except ETH and USDT are at risk due to protocol vulnerabilities being exploited. The hacker, Whitehat, has returned funds to the affected RigoBlock pool, leaving only 10% of the bug bounty reward."

"In RigoBlock Dragos, all versions as of 2022-02-17 and later (until a major protocol update is accomplished) contain an exposed function (CWE-749), specifically setMultipleAllowances() which was not set to onlyOwner. The setMultipleAllowances() function can be to manipulate tokens with the contract."

"Ref: CWE-749: Exposed Dangerous Method or Function. The software provides an Applications Programming Interface (API) or similar interface for interaction with external actors, but the interface includes a dangerous method or function that is not properly restricted."

"RigoBlock has been hacked. All tokens in Dragos but ETH and USDT are at risk due to an exploited protocol vulnerability. The fix will require a major protocol upgrade, please don’t use RigoBlock."

"Purchases and sales of RigoBlock pools is safe, everyone looking to withdraw their own funds can do that without risk."

"UPDATE: whitehat has returned recovered funds to the affected RigoBlock pool, minus a 10% bug bounty reward." "We have contacted @ethermine_org regarding the remaining funds which were part of the whitehat frontrun transaction." "After the situation in cleared up, treasury funds will be used to compensate the affected RigoBlock pools for their loss."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

• Known history of when and how the service was started.
• What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
• What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
• Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
• Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
• How were people recruited to participate?
• Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

• Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
• Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.

There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

The Reality

This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

• When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
• Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
• How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
• Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

What Happened

The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.

Key Event Timeline - RigoBlock Missing Access Controls

Date	Event	Description
February 17th, 2022 7:26:00 AM MST	Main Event	Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.

Total Amount Lost

The total amount lost has been estimated at $464,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

Immediate Reactions

How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

Ultimate Outcome

What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

A bounty of $46,000 USD was paid for the discovery.

Total Amount Recovered

The total amount recovered has been estimated at $418,000 USD.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

Ongoing Developments

What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

Individual Prevention Policies

No specific policies for individual prevention have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as an individual, check our Prevention Policies for Individuals guide.

Platform Prevention Policies

Policies for platforms to take to prevent this situation have not yet been selected in this case.

For the full list of how to protect your funds as a financial service, check our Prevention Policies for Platforms guide.

Regulatory Prevention Policies

No specific regulatory policies have yet been identified in this case.

For the full list of regulatory policies that can prevent loss, check our Prevention Policies for Regulators guide.