Poloniex Withdrawal Hack: Revision history

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8 March 2024

  • curprev 11:2511:25, 8 March 2024Azoundria talk contribs 24,289 bytes +1,066 Another 30 minutes. Revised the incident description. Added information about Poloniex founder and ultimate acquisitions. Added information about the amount lost and updated the total. Numerous revisions of the article text. Tag: Visual edit

7 March 2024

  • curprev 14:5114:51, 7 March 2024Azoundria talk contribs 23,223 bytes +3,044 Another 30 minutes complete. Further review of BitcoinTalk thread and polling information. All sources merged in. Added default content for every section to replace placeholder content. Review and revision of the article overall. Tag: Visual edit

6 March 2024

5 March 2024

4 March 2024

28 February 2024

12 April 2023

15 February 2023

22 January 2023

  • curprev 11:2411:24, 22 January 2023Azoundria talk contribs 5,760 bytes +5,760 Created page with "{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/poloniexwithdrawalhack.php}} Hot wallets are almost always hackable, whether for a silly error like this one or for more complicated exploits. Poloniex is interesting in that it presently claims insurance on the front of the website, and expressly denies having insurance in the terms of service. They’re also apparently based in the United States and working with regulators, yet unable to serve a..."