Polygon Critical Exploit Fixed - Revision history

Azoundria: Another 30 minutes complete. Additional sources merged in. Prevention completed.

2023-09-28T22:06:55Z

Another 30 minutes complete. Additional sources merged in. Prevention completed.

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:06, 28 September 2023
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	\|December 5th, 2021		\|December 5th, 2021
	\|Hard Fork Introduced		\|Hard Fork Introduced
	\|In coordination with Immunefi, a major bug bounty platform for DeFi projects, Polygon investigated the issue, validated a fix, and hard-forked on December 5 to address the vulnerability<ref name="cryptonews-9848" />.		\|In coordination with Immunefi, a major bug bounty platform for DeFi projects, Polygon investigated the issue, validated a fix, and hard-forked on December 5 to address the vulnerability<ref name="cryptonews-9848" />. The initial announcement reportedly simply calls the update "some bug fixes and also a hard fork"<ref name=":1">[https://twitter.com/moo9000/status/1468305153866485767 Mikka Ohtamaa - "How to announce a hard fork with style" - Twitter] (Sep 28, 2023)</ref>.
			\|-
			\|December 7th, 2021 12:43:00 PM MST
			\|Reportedly Launched With "Style"
			\|Polygon node operator Mikka Ohtamaa publishes criticism of the way the update is rolled out<ref name=":1" />.
	\|-		\|-
	\|December 28th, 2021 8:27:00 PM MST		\|December 28th, 2021 8:27:00 PM MST
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	== Immediate Reactions ==		== Immediate Reactions ==

			=== Reception of Update ===
			Polygon received criticism at the time of deployment from several members of the community.

			<ref name=":2">Mikko Ohtamaa - "Next time it happens can you at least announce a critical update to all Polygon node operators. Now this looks super unprofessional and confusing for the community. It was not mentioned or pinned down in any major channels or publications." - Twitter (Sep 28, 2023)</ref><blockquote>
			"Next time it happens can you at least announce a critical update to all Polygon node operators. Now this looks super unprofessional and confusing for the community. It was not mentioned or pinned down in any major channels or publications." - Mikka Ohtamaa</blockquote>


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			Some users still remained critical<ref name=":2" />.<blockquote>
			"Next time it happens can you at least announce a critical update to all Polygon node operators. Now this looks super unprofessional and confusing for the community. It was not mentioned or pinned down in any major channels or publications." - Mikka Ohtamaa</blockquote>

	"Polygon paid a total of about $3.46 million as bounty to two white hats who helped discover the bug." "Whitehat @leonspacewalker receive[d] a big $2.2m bounty for his critical find." "According to Immunefi, whitehat hacker “Leon Spacewalker” was the first to report on the security hole on Dec. 3 and will be rewarded with $2.2 million worth of stablecoins for their efforts, while the second unnamed hacker, referred to as “Whitehat2” will receive 500,000 MATIC ($1.27 million) from Polygon." "The $2.2m exceeds the maximum value of Polygon’s critical bounty in recognition of the severity of the vulnerability."		"Polygon paid a total of about $3.46 million as bounty to two white hats who helped discover the bug." "Whitehat @leonspacewalker receive[d] a big $2.2m bounty for his critical find." "According to Immunefi, whitehat hacker “Leon Spacewalker” was the first to report on the security hole on Dec. 3 and will be rewarded with $2.2 million worth of stablecoins for their efforts, while the second unnamed hacker, referred to as “Whitehat2” will receive 500,000 MATIC ($1.27 million) from Polygon." "The $2.2m exceeds the maximum value of Polygon’s critical bounty in recognition of the severity of the vulnerability."
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	== Ongoing Developments ==		== Ongoing Developments ==
	"This experience highlighted the importance of investing into an ecosystem of security expert partners. We are very grateful to Immunefi for all their help. At the end of the day, this brought Polygon a step closer to becoming the most battle-tested scaling solution for Ethereum."		"This experience highlighted the importance of investing into an ecosystem of security expert partners. We are very grateful to Immunefi for all their help. At the end of the day, this brought Polygon a step closer to becoming the most battle-tested scaling solution for Ethereum."
	~~== General Prevention Policies ==~~
	~~It is recommended that all smart contracts and new protocols obtain at least 2 independent security audits, and a third one within 6 months of launching.~~

	To limit losses if audits still fail to catch problems on new protocols, there should be an upper limit on tokens distributed by the protocol, with minting additional tokens depending on a multi-signature arrangement that can load additional tokens over time.

	In this case, the protocol had funds available to reimburse those affected. We have recommended that the industry establish an insurance fund to protect investors against losses that may exceed the capabilities of a single protocol's treasury.
	== Individual Prevention Policies ==		== Individual Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Individuals:No Individual Funds Lost}}

			The risk of other potential losses can be avoided through greater scrutiny of any protocols which are used. In this case, a missing check for sender balance would have been likely to be uncovered by most credible auditing firms, with the probability increasing exponentially with further reviews. Individuals need to pressure platforms to prioritize security and avoid platforms which haven't been adequately inspected.

	{{Prevention:Individuals:Safe Smart Contract Usage}}		{{Prevention:Individuals:Safe Smart Contract Usage}}

	~~{{Prevention:Individuals:Placeholder}}~~

	{{Prevention:Individuals:End}}		{{Prevention:Individuals:End}}

	== Platform Prevention Policies ==		== Platform Prevention Policies ==
			It is recommended that all smart contracts and new protocols obtain at least 2 independent security audits, and a third one within 6 months of launching.

			{{Prevention:Platforms:Regular Audit Procedures}}

			To limit losses if audits still fail to catch problems on new protocols, there should be an upper limit on tokens distributed by the protocol, with minting additional tokens depending on a multi-signature arrangement that can load additional tokens over time.

	{{Prevention:Platforms:Implement Multi-Signature}}		{{Prevention:Platforms:Implement Multi-Signature}}

	~~{{Prevention:Platforms:Regular Audit Procedures}}~~		In this case, the protocol had funds available to reimburse those affected. We have recommended that the industry establish an insurance fund to protect investors against losses that may exceed the capabilities of a single protocol's treasury.

	{{Prevention:Platforms:Establish Industry Insurance Fund}}		{{Prevention:Platforms:Establish Industry Insurance Fund}}
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	== Regulatory Prevention Policies ==		== Regulatory Prevention Policies ==
	This situation arguably could have been prevented with greater scrutiny of the protocol~~. In this case~~, ~~there were minimal losses, which could likely be covered through~~ the ~~protocol treasury or an industry insurance fund. If losses had been more severe, then the blockchain~~ would have ~~had to be reverted to~~ a ~~pre-exploit state, and compensation~~ would ~~have to~~ be ~~determined~~ for ~~those who traded~~ the ~~token during~~ the ~~exploit. An industry insurance fund provides~~ a ~~strong incentive for establishing solid~~ protocol ~~validators and assistance in the event of~~ a ~~breach~~.		This situation arguably could have been prevented with greater scrutiny of the protocol, as the missing check would have likely been uncovered by a smart contract auditor. It would be extremely unlikely for the missing check to not be caught with 3 independent security audits. To limit losses if multiple audits fail to catch the problem, a safer implementation could have an upper limit on tokens distributed by the protocol, with minting additional tokens depending on a trained human multi-signature arrangement.

	{{Prevention:Regulators:Platform Security Assessments}}		{{Prevention:Regulators:Platform Security Assessments}}

	~~{{Prevention:Regulators:Blockchain Level Exploit Handling}}~~		In this case, the protocol had funds available to reimburse those affected. An industry insurance fund could also easily cover losses as a fallback. We have recommended that the industry establish an insurance fund to protect investors against losses that may exceed the capabilities of a single protocol's treasury.

	{{Prevention:Regulators:Establish Industry Insurance Fund}}		{{Prevention:Regulators:Establish Industry Insurance Fund}}

			If losses had been more severe, then the blockchain could still be reverted to a pre-exploit state, and compensation would have to be determined for those who traded the token during the exploit. An industry insurance fund provides a strong incentive for establishing solid protocol validators and assistance with a rollback in the event of a breach.

			{{Prevention:Regulators:Blockchain Level Exploit Handling}}

	{{Prevention:Regulators:End}}		{{Prevention:Regulators:End}}

Azoundria: Another 30 minutes complete. Additional sources merged in. Prevention completed. Information moved around.

2023-09-13T22:53:45Z

Another 30 minutes complete. Additional sources merged in. Prevention completed. Information moved around.

Show changes

Azoundria at 21:34, 7 May 2023

2023-05-07T21:34:13Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:34, 7 May 2023
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	{{Imported Case Study\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/polygoncriticalexploitfixed.php}}		{{Imported Case Study 2\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/polygoncriticalexploitfixed.php}}
	{{Unattributed Sources}}		{{Unattributed Sources}}

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	In the end, $2.04m was taken and $3.46 was paid out in bounty. The Polygon team will cover all losses for any affected users.		In the end, $2.04m was taken and $3.46 was paid out in bounty. The Polygon team will cover all losses for any affected users.

	This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.		This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.<ref name="cointelegraph-5106" /><ref name="0xpolygontwitter-5107" /><ref name="polygonblog-5108" /><ref name="immunefimedium-5109" /><ref name="decrypt-5110" /><ref name="coindesk-5111" /><ref name="theblockcrypto-5112" /><ref name="mihailobjelictwitter-5113" /><ref name="polygon-6075" /><ref name="polygon-6076" /><ref name="talbeerysectwitter-8672" /><ref name="immunefitwitter-8673" /><ref name="coinmarketcap-8674" /><ref name="cranehehe1twitter-8727" /><ref name="cryptobriefing-8913" /><ref name="redditold-9248" /><ref name="cryptonews-9848" /><ref name="thecryptobasic-5119" />
	<ref name="cointelegraph-5106" /><ref name="0xpolygontwitter-5107" /><ref name="polygonblog-5108" /><ref name="immunefimedium-5109" /><ref name="decrypt-5110" /><ref name="coindesk-5111" /><ref name="theblockcrypto-5112" /><ref name="mihailobjelictwitter-5113" /><ref name="polygon-6075" /><ref name="polygon-6076" /><ref name="talbeerysectwitter-8672" /><ref name="immunefitwitter-8673" /><ref name="coinmarketcap-8674" /><ref name="cranehehe1twitter-8727" /><ref name="cryptobriefing-8913" /><ref name="redditold-9248" /><ref name="cryptonews-9848" />

	== About Polygon ==		== About Polygon ==
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	!Description		!Description
	\|-		\|-
	\|December 4th, 2021 ~~12:00:00 AM~~		\|December 4th, 2021
	\|Main Event		\|Main Event
	\|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.		\|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
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	\|		\|
	\|}		\|}

			== Technical Details ==
			This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

	== Total Amount Lost ==		== Total Amount Lost ==
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	== Ongoing Developments ==		== Ongoing Developments ==
	What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?		What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
			== General Prevention Policies ==
	== Prevention Policies ==
	It is recommended that all smart contracts and new protocols obtain at least 2 independent security audits, and a third one within 6 months of launching.		It is recommended that all smart contracts and new protocols obtain at least 2 independent security audits, and a third one within 6 months of launching.

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	In this case, the protocol had funds available to reimburse those affected. We have recommended that the industry establish an insurance fund to protect investors against losses that may exceed the capabilities of a single protocol's treasury.		In this case, the protocol had funds available to reimburse those affected. We have recommended that the industry establish an insurance fund to protect investors against losses that may exceed the capabilities of a single protocol's treasury.
			== Individual Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Individuals:Placeholder}}

			{{Prevention:Individuals:End}}

			== Platform Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Platforms:Placeholder}}

			{{Prevention:Platforms:End}}

			== Regulatory Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Regulators:Placeholder}}

			{{Prevention:Regulators:End}}

	== References ==		== References ==
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	<ref name="redditold-9248">[https://old.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/rs6fam/polygon_admits_the_network_was_hacked_hacker/ Polygon Admits The Network Was Hacked, Hacker Swiped 801,601 MATIC Tokens - The Crypto Basic : CryptoCurrency] (Oct 12, 2022)</ref>		<ref name="redditold-9248">[https://old.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/rs6fam/polygon_admits_the_network_was_hacked_hacker/ Polygon Admits The Network Was Hacked, Hacker Swiped 801,601 MATIC Tokens - The Crypto Basic : CryptoCurrency] (Oct 12, 2022)</ref>

	<ref name="cryptonews-9848">[https://cryptonews.com/news/polygon-justifies-its-quiet-hard-fork-citing-critical-vulnerability.htm Polygon Justifies Its Quiet Hard-Fork Citing 'Critical Vulnerability'] (Dec 1, 2022)</ref></references>		<ref name="cryptonews-9848">[https://cryptonews.com/news/polygon-justifies-its-quiet-hard-fork-citing-critical-vulnerability.htm Polygon Justifies Its Quiet Hard-Fork Citing 'Critical Vulnerability'] (Dec 1, 2022)</ref>

			<ref name="thecryptobasic-5119">[https://thecryptobasic.com/2021/12/30/polygon-admits-the-network-was-hacked-hacker-swiped-801601-matic-tokens/ Polygon Admits The Network Was Hacked, Hacker Swiped 801,601 MATIC Tokens - The Crypto Basic] (Dec 31, 2022)</ref></references>

Azoundria at 17:48, 28 February 2023

2023-02-28T17:48:02Z

Azoundria: Created page with "{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/polygoncriticalexploitfixed.php}} PolygonThe Polygon smart chain contained a critical vulnerability which would have allowed for the full drainage of all funds in the network. This was due to an additional function in the smart contract named transferWithSig, which didn't have the proper validation. Due to having a bug bounty, the issue was reported by a couple of white..."

2023-01-28T04:07:15Z

Created page with "{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/polygoncriticalexploitfixed.php}} thumb|PolygonThe Polygon smart chain contained a critical vulnerability which would have allowed for the full drainage of all funds in the network. This was due to an additional function in the smart contract named transferWithSig, which didn't have the proper validation. Due to having a bug bounty, the issue was reported by a couple of white..."

New page

{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/polygoncriticalexploitfixed.php}}

[[File:Polygon.jpg|thumb|Polygon]]The Polygon smart chain contained a critical vulnerability which would have allowed for the full drainage of all funds in the network. This was due to an additional function in the smart contract named transferWithSig, which didn't have the proper validation. Due to having a bug bounty, the issue was reported by a couple of white hackers instead of malicious entities, although it was also exploited by malicious entities.

In the end, $2.04m was taken and $3.46 was paid out in bounty. The Polygon team will cover all losses for any affected users.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

== About Polygon ==
"Polygon is a protocol and a framework for building and connecting Ethereum-compatible blockchain networks. Aggregating scalable solutions on Ethereum supporting a multi-chain Ethereum ecosystem." "Polygon is an open source project built by decentralized team of contributors from all over the world."

"We envision an open, borderless world. A world in which people and machines collaborate and exchange value globally and freely, without gatekeepers or intermediaries. A world in which communities thrive, unconstrained by artificial borders and archaic regulations." "We don’t believe in traditional companies, hierarchy and management. Anyone is welcome to contribute code, ideas or anything else that can help make our vision a reality!"

"Polygon combines the best of Ethereum and sovereign blockchains into a full-fledged multi-chain system. Polygon solves pain points associated with Blockchains, like high gas fees and slow speeds, without sacrificing on security. This multi-chain system is akin to other ones such as Polkadot, Cosmos, Avalanche etc, but with at least three major upsides: (1) It is able to fully benefit from Ethereum’s network effects. (2) It is inherently more secure. (3) It is more open and powerful."

"Polygon combines the best of Ethereum and sovereign blockchains into an attractive feature set." "Ethereum is the blockchain development platform of choice, but it has limitations. Low Throughput. Poor UX (gas, delayed PoW finality). No sovereignty (shared throughput/clogging risk, tech stack not customizable, governance dependence)." "Many projects are exploring Ethereum-compatible blockchains as a way to mitigate these limitations while still leveraging Ethereum’s thriving ecosystem."

A "vulnerability put more than 9.27 billion MATIC at risk that is valued at around $23.6 billion at the time of writing, with the figure representing the vast majority of the token’s total supply of 10 billion." "[A]nyone could [have gotten] any amount from $MATIC by abusing a vulnerable contract function that allowed sending any amount without checking if sender has enough balance. These tokens would have been created "out of thin air" (minted)."

"The network noted that a “malicious hacker” managed to steal 801,601 MATIC ($2.04 million) before the bug was resolved." "Despite our best efforts," "a blackhat–or a set of blackhats–managed to steal 801,601 MATIC tokens using the same exploit before the fix was implemented."

"The vulnerability consisted of a lack of balance/allowance check in the transfer function of Polygon’s MRC20 contract and would have allowed an attacker to steal all ~9,276,584,332 MATIC (as of December 5, the date of the fix) from that contract."

"Gasless MATIC transfers are facilitated by the transferWithSig() function. The user who owns the tokens signs a bundle of parameters including the operator, amount, nonce, and expiration. The signature can be later passed to the MRC20 contract by the operator to perform a transfer on behalf of the token owner. This is gasless for the token owner because the operator pays for the gas."

"The main issue is that _transferFrom will call the _transfer function directly without checking whether the from has enough balance. And we can call the transferWithSig() without a valid signature, thanks to the lack of a check to see if ecrecovery returns the zero address."

"The function takes the balances of from and to address and passes that to the _transfer() which also has the same issue. It doesn’t check that the sender has enough balance." "[T]he bug in the token could have allowed an attacker to mint an arbitrary number of tokens from the MRC20 contract."

"Polygon paid a total of about $3.46 million as bounty to two white hats who helped discover the bug." "Whitehat @leonspacewalker receive[d] a big $2.2m bounty for his critical find." "According to Immunefi, whitehat hacker “Leon Spacewalker” was the first to report on the security hole on Dec. 3 and will be rewarded with $2.2 million worth of stablecoins for their efforts, while the second unnamed hacker, referred to as “Whitehat2” will receive 500,000 MATIC ($1.27 million) from Polygon." "The $2.2m exceeds the maximum value of Polygon’s critical bounty in recognition of the severity of the vulnerability."

"The project’s co-founder Jaynti Kanani said that such a situation was bound to occur “sooner or later,” but the outcome was a testament to the network’s resilience."

“What’s important is that this was a test of our network’s resilience as well as our ability to act decisively under pressure. Considering how much was at stake, I believe our team has made the best decisions possible given the circumstances.”

"[T]he fix, a hard fork live across 90% of network validators by Block #22156660, according to Polygon’s timeline of events, protected a massive trove of funds for the Ethereum scaling tool. Polygon hadn’t publicly discussed the reasoning for the hard fork before Wednesday." "The upgrade was executed on Dec. 5 without impacting liveness and performance of the network in any major way. The vulnerability was fixed and damage was mitigated, with there being no material harm to the protocol and its end-users. All Polygon contracts and node implementations remain fully open source." "The foundation will bear the cost of the theft."

"CoinDesk reviewed the Polygon Discord server’s validator channel on Dec. 5. It contained multiple validators expressing anger over the core developers’ silence on pushing what is usually a major and well-publicized software upgrade through the shadows." "Indeed, the abrupt hard fork had spillover effects for the network as validators unprepared for the shift were knocked offline, according to the Discord logs." "Though details of the incident wouldn't be released until December 29, chatter on social media in mid-December emerged about Polygon's silent, zero-warning hard fork."

"At the time, Polygon co-founder Mihailo Bjelic said that there was a vulnerability and that the team would release additional details. "We are now investing much more in security and we're making an effort to improve security practices across all Polygon projects," he wrote at the time."

"This experience highlighted the importance of investing into an ecosystem of security expert partners. We are very grateful to Immunefi for all their help. At the end of the day, this brought Polygon a step closer to becoming the most battle-tested scaling solution for Ethereum."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

* Known history of when and how the service was started.
* What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
* What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
* Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
* Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
* How were people recruited to participate?
* Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:
* Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
* Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

== The Reality ==
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

* When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
* Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
* How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
* Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

== What Happened ==
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
{| class="wikitable"
|+Key Event Timeline - Polygon Critical Exploit Fixed
!Date
!Event
!Description
|-
|December 4th, 2021 12:00:00 AM
|Main Event
|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
|-
|
|
|
|}

== Total Amount Lost ==
The total amount at risk has been estimated at $21,057,846,000 USD. The total amount lost has been estimated at $1,820,000 USD.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

== Immediate Reactions ==
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

== Ultimate Outcome ==
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

A bounty of $3,470,000 USD was paid for the discovery.

== Total Amount Recovered ==
The total amount recovered has been estimated at $1,820,000 USD.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

== Ongoing Developments ==
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

== Prevention Policies ==
It is recommended that all smart contracts and new protocols obtain at least 2 independent security audits, and a third one within 6 months of launching.

To limit losses if audits still fail to catch problems on new protocols, there should be an upper limit on tokens distributed by the protocol, with minting additional tokens depending on a multi-signature arrangement that can load additional tokens over time.

In this case, the protocol had funds available to reimburse those affected. We have recommended that the industry establish an insurance fund to protect investors against losses that may exceed the capabilities of a single protocol's treasury.

== References ==
[https://cointelegraph.com/news/polygon-upgrade-quietly-fixes-bug-that-put-24b-of-matic-at-risk Polygon upgrade quietly fixes bug that put $24B of MATIC at risk] (Dec 30)

[https://twitter.com/0xPolygon/status/1476032036804513792 @0xPolygon Twitter] (Jan 2)

[https://blog.polygon.technology/all-you-need-to-know-about-the-recent-network-upgrade/ All You Need to Know About the Recent Network Upgrade — Polygon | Blog] (Jan 2)

[https://medium.com/immunefi/polygon-lack-of-balance-check-bugfix-postmortem-2-2m-bounty-64ec66c24c7d Polygon Lack Of Balance Check Bugfix Postmortem 2 2m Bounty] (Jan 2)

[https://decrypt.co/89514/polygon-quietly-patched-vulnerability-that-put-24-billion-in-matic-at-risk Polygon Quietly Patched Vulnerability That Put $24 Billion in MATIC at Risk - Decrypt] (Jan 2)

[https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2021/12/29/polygon-discloses-patched-exploit-that-put-9b-matic-at-risk/ Polygon Discloses Patched Exploit That Put 9B MATIC at Risk] (Jan 2)

[https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/128784/polygon-critical-bug-24-billion-matic-tokens-at-risk-hard-fork 'Critical' Polygon bug put $24 billion in tokens at risk until recent hard fork] (Jan 2)

[https://twitter.com/MihailoBjelic/status/1471114922247528458 @MihailoBjelic Twitter] (Jan 2)

[https://polygon.technology/ Polygon | Ethereum's Internet of Blockchains] (Jan 29)

[https://polygon.technology/about/ About - Polygon | Ethereum's Internet of Blockchains] (Jan 29)

[https://twitter.com/TalBeerySec/status/1477327949842075648 @TalBeerySec Twitter] (Jul 22)

[https://twitter.com/immunefi/status/1476028698751082507 @immunefi Twitter] (Jul 22)

[https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/polygon/historical-data/ https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/polygon/historical-data/] (Jul 22)

[https://twitter.com/Cranehehe1/status/1476323347579674625 @Cranehehe1 Twitter] (Jul 23)

[https://cryptobriefing.com/a-hacker-stole-1-6m-after-exploiting-a-polygon-bug/ A Hacker Stole $1.6M After Exploiting a Polygon Bug - Crypto Briefing] (Aug 24)

[https://old.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/rs6fam/polygon_admits_the_network_was_hacked_hacker/ Polygon Admits The Network Was Hacked, Hacker Swiped 801,601 MATIC Tokens - The Crypto Basic : CryptoCurrency] (Oct 12)

[https://cryptonews.com/news/polygon-justifies-its-quiet-hard-fork-citing-critical-vulnerability.htm Polygon Justifies Its Quiet Hard-Fork Citing 'Critical Vulnerability'] (Dec 1)

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:48, 28 February 2023
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	{{Imported Case Study\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/polygoncriticalexploitfixed.php}}		{{Imported Case Study\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/polygoncriticalexploitfixed.php}}
			{{Unattributed Sources}}

	[[File:Polygon.jpg\|thumb\|Polygon]]The Polygon smart chain contained a critical vulnerability which would have allowed for the full drainage of all funds in the network. This was due to an additional function in the smart contract named transferWithSig, which didn't have the proper validation. Due to having a bug bounty, the issue was reported by a couple of white hackers instead of malicious entities, although it was also exploited by malicious entities.		[[File:Polygon.jpg\|thumb\|Polygon]]The Polygon smart chain contained a critical vulnerability which would have allowed for the full drainage of all funds in the network. This was due to an additional function in the smart contract named transferWithSig, which didn't have the proper validation. Due to having a bug bounty, the issue was reported by a couple of white hackers instead of malicious entities, although it was also exploited by malicious entities.
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	This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.		This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
			<ref name="cointelegraph-5106" /><ref name="0xpolygontwitter-5107" /><ref name="polygonblog-5108" /><ref name="immunefimedium-5109" /><ref name="decrypt-5110" /><ref name="coindesk-5111" /><ref name="theblockcrypto-5112" /><ref name="mihailobjelictwitter-5113" /><ref name="polygon-6075" /><ref name="polygon-6076" /><ref name="talbeerysectwitter-8672" /><ref name="immunefitwitter-8673" /><ref name="coinmarketcap-8674" /><ref name="cranehehe1twitter-8727" /><ref name="cryptobriefing-8913" /><ref name="redditold-9248" /><ref name="cryptonews-9848" />

	== About Polygon ==		== About Polygon ==
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	== References ==		== References ==
	[https://cointelegraph.com/news/polygon-upgrade-quietly-fixes-bug-that-put-24b-of-matic-at-risk Polygon upgrade quietly fixes bug that put $24B of MATIC at risk] (Dec 30)		<references><ref name="cointelegraph-5106">[https://cointelegraph.com/news/polygon-upgrade-quietly-fixes-bug-that-put-24b-of-matic-at-risk Polygon upgrade quietly fixes bug that put $24B of MATIC at risk] (Dec 30, 2022)</ref>

	[https://twitter.com/0xPolygon/status/1476032036804513792 @0xPolygon Twitter] (Jan 2)		<ref name="0xpolygontwitter-5107">[https://twitter.com/0xPolygon/status/1476032036804513792 @0xPolygon Twitter] (Jan 2, 2022)</ref>

	[https://blog.polygon.technology/all-you-need-to-know-about-the-recent-network-upgrade/ All You Need to Know About the Recent Network Upgrade — Polygon \| Blog] (Jan 2)		<ref name="polygonblog-5108">[https://blog.polygon.technology/all-you-need-to-know-about-the-recent-network-upgrade/ All You Need to Know About the Recent Network Upgrade — Polygon \| Blog] (Jan 2, 2022)</ref>

	[https://medium.com/immunefi/polygon-lack-of-balance-check-bugfix-postmortem-2-2m-bounty-64ec66c24c7d Polygon Lack Of Balance Check Bugfix Postmortem 2 2m Bounty] (Jan 2)		<ref name="immunefimedium-5109">[https://medium.com/immunefi/polygon-lack-of-balance-check-bugfix-postmortem-2-2m-bounty-64ec66c24c7d Polygon Lack Of Balance Check Bugfix Postmortem 2 2m Bounty] (Jan 2, 2022)</ref>

	[https://decrypt.co/89514/polygon-quietly-patched-vulnerability-that-put-24-billion-in-matic-at-risk Polygon Quietly Patched Vulnerability That Put $24 Billion in MATIC at Risk - Decrypt] (Jan 2)		<ref name="decrypt-5110">[https://decrypt.co/89514/polygon-quietly-patched-vulnerability-that-put-24-billion-in-matic-at-risk Polygon Quietly Patched Vulnerability That Put $24 Billion in MATIC at Risk - Decrypt] (Jan 2, 2022)</ref>

	[https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2021/12/29/polygon-discloses-patched-exploit-that-put-9b-matic-at-risk/ Polygon Discloses Patched Exploit That Put 9B MATIC at Risk] (Jan 2)		<ref name="coindesk-5111">[https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2021/12/29/polygon-discloses-patched-exploit-that-put-9b-matic-at-risk/ Polygon Discloses Patched Exploit That Put 9B MATIC at Risk] (Jan 2, 2022)</ref>

	[https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/128784/polygon-critical-bug-24-billion-matic-tokens-at-risk-hard-fork 'Critical' Polygon bug put $24 billion in tokens at risk until recent hard fork] (Jan 2)		<ref name="theblockcrypto-5112">[https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/128784/polygon-critical-bug-24-billion-matic-tokens-at-risk-hard-fork 'Critical' Polygon bug put $24 billion in tokens at risk until recent hard fork] (Jan 2, 2022)</ref>

	[https://twitter.com/MihailoBjelic/status/1471114922247528458 @MihailoBjelic Twitter] (Jan 2)		<ref name="mihailobjelictwitter-5113">[https://twitter.com/MihailoBjelic/status/1471114922247528458 @MihailoBjelic Twitter] (Jan 2, 2022)</ref>

	[https://polygon.technology/ Polygon \| Ethereum's Internet of Blockchains] (Jan 29)		<ref name="polygon-6075">[https://polygon.technology/ Polygon \| Ethereum's Internet of Blockchains] (Jan 29, 2022)</ref>

	[https://polygon.technology/about/ About - Polygon \| Ethereum's Internet of Blockchains] (Jan 29)		<ref name="polygon-6076">[https://polygon.technology/about/ About - Polygon \| Ethereum's Internet of Blockchains] (Jan 29, 2022)</ref>

	[https://twitter.com/TalBeerySec/status/1477327949842075648 @TalBeerySec Twitter] (Jul 22)		<ref name="talbeerysectwitter-8672">[https://twitter.com/TalBeerySec/status/1477327949842075648 @TalBeerySec Twitter] (Jul 22, 2022)</ref>

	[https://twitter.com/immunefi/status/1476028698751082507 @immunefi Twitter] (Jul 22)		<ref name="immunefitwitter-8673">[https://twitter.com/immunefi/status/1476028698751082507 @immunefi Twitter] (Jul 22, 2022)</ref>

	[https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/polygon/historical-data/ https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/polygon/historical-data/] (Jul 22)		<ref name="coinmarketcap-8674">[https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/polygon/historical-data/ https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/polygon/historical-data/] (Jul 22, 2022)</ref>

	[https://twitter.com/Cranehehe1/status/1476323347579674625 @Cranehehe1 Twitter] (Jul 23)		<ref name="cranehehe1twitter-8727">[https://twitter.com/Cranehehe1/status/1476323347579674625 @Cranehehe1 Twitter] (Jul 23, 2022)</ref>

	[https://cryptobriefing.com/a-hacker-stole-1-6m-after-exploiting-a-polygon-bug/ A Hacker Stole $1.6M After Exploiting a Polygon Bug - Crypto Briefing] (Aug 24)		<ref name="cryptobriefing-8913">[https://cryptobriefing.com/a-hacker-stole-1-6m-after-exploiting-a-polygon-bug/ A Hacker Stole $1.6M After Exploiting a Polygon Bug - Crypto Briefing] (Aug 24, 2022)</ref>

	[https://old.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/rs6fam/polygon_admits_the_network_was_hacked_hacker/ Polygon Admits The Network Was Hacked, Hacker Swiped 801,601 MATIC Tokens - The Crypto Basic : CryptoCurrency] (Oct 12)		<ref name="redditold-9248">[https://old.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/rs6fam/polygon_admits_the_network_was_hacked_hacker/ Polygon Admits The Network Was Hacked, Hacker Swiped 801,601 MATIC Tokens - The Crypto Basic : CryptoCurrency] (Oct 12, 2022)</ref>

	[https://cryptonews.com/news/polygon-justifies-its-quiet-hard-fork-citing-critical-vulnerability.htm Polygon Justifies Its Quiet Hard-Fork Citing 'Critical Vulnerability'] (Dec 1)		<ref name="cryptonews-9848">[https://cryptonews.com/news/polygon-justifies-its-quiet-hard-fork-citing-critical-vulnerability.htm Polygon Justifies Its Quiet Hard-Fork Citing 'Critical Vulnerability'] (Dec 1, 2022)</ref></references>