MakerDao Web3 DeFi Phishing - Revision history

Azoundria at 19:34, 1 May 2023

2023-05-01T19:34:45Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:34, 1 May 2023
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	{{Imported Case Study\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/makerdaoweb3defiphishing.php}}		{{Imported Case Study 2\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/makerdaoweb3defiphishing.php}}
	{{Unattributed ~~Citations~~}}		{{Unattributed Sources}}

	[[File:Makerdaophish.jpg\|thumb\|MakerDAO]]It is incredibly easy for malicious actors to create web applications which look identical to a major smart contract. The URL may be different by a single character, and only the center of the wallet address could be different.		[[File:Makerdaophish.jpg\|thumb\|MakerDAO]]It is incredibly easy for malicious actors to create web applications which look identical to a major smart contract. The URL may be different by a single character, and only the center of the wallet address could be different.
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	At least $100k USD has been scammed through this method.		At least $100k USD has been scammed through this method.

	This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.		This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.<ref name="slowmisthacked-678" /><ref name="makerdaoforum-1848" /><ref name="reddit-1849" /><ref name="reddit-1850" /><ref name="mycryptoblog-1851" />
	<ref name="slowmisthacked-678" /><ref name="makerdaoforum-1848" /><ref name="reddit-1849" /><ref name="reddit-1850" /><ref name="mycryptoblog-1851" />

	== About MakerDAO ==		== About MakerDAO ==
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	!Description		!Description
	\|-		\|-
	\|June 25th, 2020 ~~12:00:00 AM~~		\|June 25th, 2020
	\|Main Event		\|Main Event
	\|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.		\|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
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	\|		\|
	\|}		\|}

			== Technical Details ==
			This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

	== Total Amount Lost ==		== Total Amount Lost ==
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	== Ongoing Developments ==		== Ongoing Developments ==
	What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?		What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
			== General Prevention Policies ==
			With centralized platforms, phishing attacks increase in difficulty significantly. The platform has the ability to seek email confirmation, perform two factor authentication, and institute delays on key activities like withdrawals, all of which would increase the likelihood of the phish being discovered and prevented before completion.
			== Individual Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Individuals:Placeholder}}

			{{Prevention:Individuals:End}}

			== Platform Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Platforms:Placeholder}}

			{{Prevention:Platforms:End}}

			== Regulatory Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Regulators:Placeholder}}

	== Prevention ~~Policies ==~~		{{Prevention:Regulators:End}}
	With centralized platforms, phishing attacks increase in difficulty significantly. The platform has the ability to seek email confirmation, perform two factor authentication, and institute delays on key activities like withdrawals, all of which would increase the likelihood of the phish being discovered and prevented before completion.

	== References ==		== References ==
	<references><ref name="slowmisthacked-678">[https://hacked.slowmist.io/en/?c=ETH%20DApp SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone] (May 17, 2021)</ref>		<references><ref name="slowmisthacked-678">[https://hacked.slowmist.io/en/?c=ETH%20DApp SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone] (May 18, 2021)</ref>

	<ref name="makerdaoforum-1848">[https://forum.makerdao.com/t/possible-scam-migrating-sai-to-dai/1201/7 Possible scam migrating SAI to DAI - #7 by salanki - Miscellaneous - The Maker Forum] (Jul 25, 2021)</ref>		<ref name="makerdaoforum-1848">[https://forum.makerdao.com/t/possible-scam-migrating-sai-to-dai/1201/7 Possible scam migrating SAI to DAI - #7 by salanki - Miscellaneous - The Maker Forum] (Jul 26, 2021)</ref>

	<ref name="reddit-1849">[https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/comments/7pxh6x/is_daistablecoincom_a_phishing_scam/ Is dai-stablecoin.com a phishing scam? : MakerDAO] (Jul 25, 2021)</ref>		<ref name="reddit-1849">[https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/comments/7pxh6x/is_daistablecoincom_a_phishing_scam/ Is dai-stablecoin.com a phishing scam? : MakerDAO] (Jul 26, 2021)</ref>

	<ref name="reddit-1850">[https://www.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/evjegh/a_couple_thoughts_on_web3_phishing_inc_live/ A couple thoughts on web3 phishing (inc. live attacks against MakerDAO) : ethdev] (Jul 25, 2021)</ref>		<ref name="reddit-1850">[https://www.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/evjegh/a_couple_thoughts_on_web3_phishing_inc_live/ A couple thoughts on web3 phishing (inc. live attacks against MakerDAO) : ethdev] (Jul 26, 2021)</ref>

	<ref name="mycryptoblog-1851">[https://blog.mycrypto.com/phishing-campaigns-take-aim-at-web3-defi-applications/ Phishing Campaigns Take Aim at Web3 DeFi Applications] (Jul 25, 2021)</ref></references>		<ref name="mycryptoblog-1851">[https://blog.mycrypto.com/phishing-campaigns-take-aim-at-web3-defi-applications/ Phishing Campaigns Take Aim at Web3 DeFi Applications] (Jul 26, 2021)</ref></references>

Azoundria at 17:18, 17 February 2023

2023-02-17T17:18:34Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:18, 17 February 2023
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	{{Imported Case Study\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/makerdaoweb3defiphishing.php}}		{{Imported Case Study\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/makerdaoweb3defiphishing.php}}
			{{Unattributed Citations}}

	[[File:Makerdaophish.jpg\|thumb\|MakerDAO]]It is incredibly easy for malicious actors to create web applications which look identical to a major smart contract. The URL may be different by a single character, and only the center of the wallet address could be different.		[[File:Makerdaophish.jpg\|thumb\|MakerDAO]]It is incredibly easy for malicious actors to create web applications which look identical to a major smart contract. The URL may be different by a single character, and only the center of the wallet address could be different.
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	This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.		This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
			<ref name="slowmisthacked-678" /><ref name="makerdaoforum-1848" /><ref name="reddit-1849" /><ref name="reddit-1850" /><ref name="mycryptoblog-1851" />

	== About MakerDAO ==		== About MakerDAO ==
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	Don't Include:		Don't Include:

	* Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.		* Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
	* Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.		* Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
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	\|-		\|-
	\|June 25th, 2020 12:00:00 AM		\|June 25th, 2020 12:00:00 AM
	\|~~First~~ Event		\|Main Event
	\|~~This is an expanded~~ description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.		\|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
	\|-
	\|
	\|
	\|
	\|-		\|-
	\|		\|
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	== Total Amount Lost ==		== Total Amount Lost ==
	The total amount lost ~~is unknown~~.		The total amount lost has been estimated at $100,000 USD.

	How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?		How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?
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	== Total Amount Recovered ==		== Total Amount Recovered ==
	~~It is unknown how much was~~ recovered.		There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

	What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?		What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
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	== References ==		== References ==
	[https://hacked.slowmist.io/en/?c=ETH%20DApp SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone] (May 17)		<references><ref name="slowmisthacked-678">[https://hacked.slowmist.io/en/?c=ETH%20DApp SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone] (May 17, 2021)</ref>

	[https://forum.makerdao.com/t/possible-scam-migrating-sai-to-dai/1201/7 Possible scam migrating SAI to DAI - #7 by salanki - Miscellaneous - The Maker Forum] (Jul 25)		<ref name="makerdaoforum-1848">[https://forum.makerdao.com/t/possible-scam-migrating-sai-to-dai/1201/7 Possible scam migrating SAI to DAI - #7 by salanki - Miscellaneous - The Maker Forum] (Jul 25, 2021)</ref>

	[https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/comments/7pxh6x/is_daistablecoincom_a_phishing_scam/ Is dai-stablecoin.com a phishing scam? : MakerDAO] (Jul 25)		<ref name="reddit-1849">[https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/comments/7pxh6x/is_daistablecoincom_a_phishing_scam/ Is dai-stablecoin.com a phishing scam? : MakerDAO] (Jul 25, 2021)</ref>

	[https://www.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/evjegh/a_couple_thoughts_on_web3_phishing_inc_live/ A couple thoughts on web3 phishing (inc. live attacks against MakerDAO) : ethdev] (Jul 25)		<ref name="reddit-1850">[https://www.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/evjegh/a_couple_thoughts_on_web3_phishing_inc_live/ A couple thoughts on web3 phishing (inc. live attacks against MakerDAO) : ethdev] (Jul 25, 2021)</ref>

	[https://blog.mycrypto.com/phishing-campaigns-take-aim-at-web3-defi-applications/ Phishing Campaigns Take Aim at Web3 DeFi Applications] (Jul 25)		<ref name="mycryptoblog-1851">[https://blog.mycrypto.com/phishing-campaigns-take-aim-at-web3-defi-applications/ Phishing Campaigns Take Aim at Web3 DeFi Applications] (Jul 25, 2021)</ref></references>

Azoundria: Created page with "{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/makerdaoweb3defiphishing.php}} MakerDAOIt is incredibly easy for malicious actors to create web applications which look identical to a major smart contract. The URL may be different by a single character, and only the center of the wallet address could be different. At least $100k USD has been scammed through this method. This is a global/international case not i..."

2023-01-25T17:31:50Z

Created page with "{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/makerdaoweb3defiphishing.php}} thumb|MakerDAOIt is incredibly easy for malicious actors to create web applications which look identical to a major smart contract. The URL may be different by a single character, and only the center of the wallet address could be different. At least $100k USD has been scammed through this method. This is a global/international case not i..."

New page

{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/makerdaoweb3defiphishing.php}}

[[File:Makerdaophish.jpg|thumb|MakerDAO]]It is incredibly easy for malicious actors to create web applications which look identical to a major smart contract. The URL may be different by a single character, and only the center of the wallet address could be different.

At least $100k USD has been scammed through this method.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

== About MakerDAO ==
"It was only a matter of time before phishers took attacks against the crypto industry a step further by integrating their attacks with the web3 ecosystem. Up until this point, phishers have focused on gaining access to users’ seed phrases, private keys, or usernames and passwords. Today, that changed. A world of DeFi applications, which only interact with a user via their wallet and never require a user to enter credentials, recovery phrases, or passwords into them are now being targeted. These new attacks are beginning to exploit the tools that we use to interface with our crypto."

"Our analysts first became aware of the MakerDAO phish after receiving a community report for makerdao[.]tools on 14 January. The fraudulent website mimicked the process of converting SAI to DAI."

"This domain hosted a simple interface that indicated you would be initiating a 1:1 conversion from Single-Collateral DAI (SAI) to the new DAI — just like the official bridge. However, the transaction you would actually sign would simply send SAI to an address owned by the attackers."

"The malicious Web3 applications "phishing dapps" were discovered in a recent study, they pretend to be legitimate applications or services to steal cryptocurrencies. For example, since MakerDAO officially closed the single-mortgage Sai system, such phishing tools have begun to appear, and they pretended to need a new tool to help users migrate from SAI to DAI. For example, a domain name provides a simple interface to start the migration from SAI to the new DAI at a 1:1 ratio, it seems like an official channel. However, the actual transaction to be signed simply sends the SAI to an address owned by the attacker. SAI, which has been traced to more than US$100,000, was transferred to the attacker's account."

"This iteration of Web3 phishing, at least from the samples we discovered, appears to be run by a group of bad actors. A cluster of them resided on the same infrastructure along with other cryptocurrency scams — 198.54.120.244. This appears to be a shared web hosting server offered by Namecheap, but due to the overlap in content and method of attack, it is safe to assume the campaigns are being run by the same actors."

"Deleted the links. They scammed for 36,166 USD so far already. Is there anything we can do to stop this?" "Please report to Ethereum Scam Database, so it will be blocked by Metamask and hopefully others."

"Crypto is a high value target for criminals and as such we can expect an immense amount of resources to be thrown into developing new attacks to target its users. We can already see the first moves being made by phishers, so it’s important that we stay ahead of the curve. Good UX design, user education, and security-minded development all contribute to this."

"Given the amount of tech and the speed at which it is changing, your average user is going to have a hard time staying on top of how to avoid being phished. In web2.0, we saw this being an issue when for years users were told to look for the green padlock on a site. Then, phishers started using HTTPS and all of a sudden that check failed."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

* Known history of when and how the service was started.
* What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
* What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
* Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
* Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
* How were people recruited to participate?
* Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

* Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
* Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

== The Reality ==
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

* When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
* Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
* How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
* Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

== What Happened ==
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
{| class="wikitable"
|+Key Event Timeline - MakerDao Web3 DeFi Phishing
!Date
!Event
!Description
|-
|June 25th, 2020 12:00:00 AM
|First Event
|This is an expanded description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
|-
|
|
|
|-
|
|
|
|}

== Total Amount Lost ==
The total amount lost is unknown.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

== Immediate Reactions ==
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

== Ultimate Outcome ==
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

== Total Amount Recovered ==
It is unknown how much was recovered.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

== Ongoing Developments ==
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

== Prevention Policies ==
With centralized platforms, phishing attacks increase in difficulty significantly. The platform has the ability to seek email confirmation, perform two factor authentication, and institute delays on key activities like withdrawals, all of which would increase the likelihood of the phish being discovered and prevented before completion.

== References ==
[https://hacked.slowmist.io/en/?c=ETH%20DApp SlowMist Hacked - SlowMist Zone] (May 17)

[https://forum.makerdao.com/t/possible-scam-migrating-sai-to-dai/1201/7 Possible scam migrating SAI to DAI - #7 by salanki - Miscellaneous - The Maker Forum] (Jul 25)

[https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/comments/7pxh6x/is_daistablecoincom_a_phishing_scam/ Is dai-stablecoin.com a phishing scam? : MakerDAO] (Jul 25)

[https://www.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/evjegh/a_couple_thoughts_on_web3_phishing_inc_live/ A couple thoughts on web3 phishing (inc. live attacks against MakerDAO) : ethdev] (Jul 25)

[https://blog.mycrypto.com/phishing-campaigns-take-aim-at-web3-defi-applications/ Phishing Campaigns Take Aim at Web3 DeFi Applications] (Jul 25)