KeepKey Scam Chrome Application Theft - Revision history

Azoundria at 19:31, 1 May 2023

2023-05-01T19:31:30Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:31, 1 May 2023
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	{{Imported Case Study\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyscamchromeapplicationtheft.php}}		{{Imported Case Study 2\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyscamchromeapplicationtheft.php}}
	{{Unattributed Sources}}		{{Unattributed Sources}}

	[[File:Keepkey.jpg\|thumb\|KeepKey]]KeepKey had a Google Chrome extension which users could previously use to manage their funds. A malicious version of the extension was created and made available for download. At least one unsuspecting user downloaded and installed the malicious extension, which requested them to enter their seed phrase.		[[File:Keepkey.jpg\|thumb\|KeepKey]]KeepKey had a Google Chrome extension which users could previously use to manage their funds. A malicious version of the extension was created and made available for download. At least one unsuspecting user downloaded and installed the malicious extension, which requested them to enter their seed phrase.

	This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.		This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.<ref name="shapeshift-7559" /><ref name="shapeshiftzendesk-7906" /><ref name="shapeshift-7907" /><ref name="chromegoogle-7908" />
	<ref name="shapeshift-7559" /><ref name="shapeshiftzendesk-7906" /><ref name="shapeshift-7907" /><ref name="chromegoogle-7908" />

	== About KeepKey ==		== About KeepKey ==
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	!Description		!Description
	\|-		\|-
	\|April 27th, 2020 10:41:00 AM		\|April 27th, 2020 10:41:00 AM MDT
	\|Main Event		\|Main Event
	\|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.		\|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
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	\|		\|
	\|}		\|}

			== Technical Details ==
			This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

	== Total Amount Lost ==		== Total Amount Lost ==
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	== Ongoing Developments ==		== Ongoing Developments ==
	What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?		What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
			== General Prevention Policies ==
			Always download wallets starting from the official source. Always test new wallets with smaller balances. Keep the majority of funds fully offline unless actively using them.
			== Individual Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Individuals:Placeholder}}

			{{Prevention:Individuals:End}}

			== Platform Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Platforms:Placeholder}}

			{{Prevention:Platforms:End}}

			== Regulatory Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Regulators:Placeholder}}

	== Prevention ~~Policies ==~~		{{Prevention:Regulators:End}}
	~~Always download wallets starting from the official source. Always test new wallets with smaller balances. Keep the majority of funds fully offline unless actively using them.~~

	== References ==		== References ==

Azoundria at 16:50, 22 February 2023

2023-02-22T16:50:27Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:50, 22 February 2023
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	{{Imported Case Study\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyscamchromeapplicationtheft.php}}		{{Imported Case Study\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyscamchromeapplicationtheft.php}}
			{{Unattributed Sources}}

	[[File:Keepkey.jpg\|thumb\|KeepKey]]KeepKey had a Google Chrome extension which users could previously use to manage their funds. A malicious version of the extension was created and made available for download. At least one unsuspecting user downloaded and installed the malicious extension, which requested them to enter their seed phrase.		[[File:Keepkey.jpg\|thumb\|KeepKey]]KeepKey had a Google Chrome extension which users could previously use to manage their funds. A malicious version of the extension was created and made available for download. At least one unsuspecting user downloaded and installed the malicious extension, which requested them to enter their seed phrase.

	This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.		This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
			<ref name="shapeshift-7559" /><ref name="shapeshiftzendesk-7906" /><ref name="shapeshift-7907" /><ref name="chromegoogle-7908" />

	== About KeepKey ==		== About KeepKey ==
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	Don't Include:		Don't Include:

	* Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.		* Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
	* Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.		* Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
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	\|-		\|-
	\|April 27th, 2020 10:41:00 AM		\|April 27th, 2020 10:41:00 AM
	\|~~First~~ Event		\|Main Event
	\|~~This is an expanded~~ description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.		\|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
	\|-
	\|
	\|
	\|
	\|-		\|-
	\|		\|
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	== Total Amount Recovered ==		== Total Amount Recovered ==
	~~It is unknown how much was~~ recovered.		There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

	What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?		What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
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	== References ==		== References ==
	[https://shapeshift.com/keepkey KeepKey - Hardware Wallet \| ShapeShift] (May 2)		<references><ref name="shapeshift-7559">[https://shapeshift.com/keepkey KeepKey - Hardware Wallet \| ShapeShift] (May 2, 2022)</ref>

	[https://shapeshift.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013876999-End-of-KeepKey-Chrome-App-Do-Not-Use https://shapeshift.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013876999-End-of-KeepKey-Chrome-App-Do-Not-Use] (Jun 4)		<ref name="shapeshiftzendesk-7906">[https://shapeshift.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013876999-End-of-KeepKey-Chrome-App-Do-Not-Use https://shapeshift.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013876999-End-of-KeepKey-Chrome-App-Do-Not-Use] (Jun 4, 2022)</ref>

	[https://shapeshift.com/library/shapeshift-security-update-keepkey-client-google-chrome ShapeShift Security Update: KeepKey Client] (Jun 4)		<ref name="shapeshift-7907">[https://shapeshift.com/library/shapeshift-security-update-keepkey-client-google-chrome ShapeShift Security Update: KeepKey Client] (Jun 4, 2022)</ref>

	[https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepkey-client/idgiipeogajjpkgheijapngmlbohdhjg KeepKey Client - Chrome Web Store] (Jun 4)		<ref name="chromegoogle-7908">[https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepkey-client/idgiipeogajjpkgheijapngmlbohdhjg KeepKey Client - Chrome Web Store] (Jun 4, 2022)</ref></references>

Azoundria: Created page with "{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyscamchromeapplicationtheft.php}} KeepKeyKeepKey had a Google Chrome extension which users could previously use to manage their funds. A malicious version of the extension was created and made available for download. At least one unsuspecting user downloaded and installed the malicious extension, which requested them to enter their seed phrase. This is a global/in..."

2023-01-25T17:21:39Z

Created page with "{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyscamchromeapplicationtheft.php}} thumb|KeepKeyKeepKey had a Google Chrome extension which users could previously use to manage their funds. A malicious version of the extension was created and made available for download. At least one unsuspecting user downloaded and installed the malicious extension, which requested them to enter their seed phrase. This is a global/in..."

New page

{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyscamchromeapplicationtheft.php}}

[[File:Keepkey.jpg|thumb|KeepKey]]KeepKey had a Google Chrome extension which users could previously use to manage their funds. A malicious version of the extension was created and made available for download. At least one unsuspecting user downloaded and installed the malicious extension, which requested them to enter their seed phrase.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

== About KeepKey ==
"The Next Frontier of Crypto Security. Protect your cryptocurrencies, store your private keys offline, and safeguard your assets from hackers. It’s time to achieve financial freedom in the most secure way with KeepKey."

"Beginning in June 2020, Google will be ending support for the Chrome Apps. We recommend all KeepKey Chrome App Client users move to the ShapeShift Platform. The platform allows you to send, receive, trade, and securely hold your KeepKey assets."

"[T]here are scam versions which can steal your money. Use your KeepKey ONLY with the ShapeShift web platform." "ShapeShift owns and operates the reputable hardware wallet known as KeepKey. It has come to our attention that a malicious actor published a malicious KeepKey extension on the Google Chrome app store. This malicious extension is designed to look like our legitimate KeepKey extension, which is also available in the Google Chrome app store. When a user installs the malicious extension, they are asked to enter their wallet seed phrase, which can be used to unlock the funds on a KeepKey."

"This is different from how KeepKey’s extension works: our extension never asks the user to enter their wallet seed phrase. At the time of this post, we know of at least one unsuspecting KeepKey user who apparently entered their seed phrase into this malicious extension - resulting in the phrase being sent to the attacker. The user’s cryptocurrency was then stolen by the malicious actor or actors now in possession of the user’s seed phrase."

"ShapeShift has taken swift action to combat this malicious software. Our team has filed multiple reports with the Google Chrome app store requesting the removal of the malicious extension. We have also located the hosting service that is hosting the website to which seed phrases were sent and filed the appropriate requests. We have reported this bad actor to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to further protect our users. Unfortunately, this is a cat and mouse game consisting of moving targets as new malicious extensions are being detected daily."

"The KeepKey Chrome app has been retired."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

* Known history of when and how the service was started.
* What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
* What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
* Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
* Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
* How were people recruited to participate?
* Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

* Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
* Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

== The Reality ==
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

* When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
* Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
* How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
* Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

== What Happened ==
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
{| class="wikitable"
|+Key Event Timeline - KeepKey Scam Chrome Application Theft
!Date
!Event
!Description
|-
|April 27th, 2020 10:41:00 AM
|First Event
|This is an expanded description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
|-
|
|
|
|-
|
|
|
|}

== Total Amount Lost ==
The total amount lost is unknown.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

== Immediate Reactions ==
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

== Ultimate Outcome ==
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

== Total Amount Recovered ==
It is unknown how much was recovered.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

== Ongoing Developments ==
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

== Prevention Policies ==
Always download wallets starting from the official source. Always test new wallets with smaller balances. Keep the majority of funds fully offline unless actively using them.

== References ==
[https://shapeshift.com/keepkey KeepKey - Hardware Wallet | ShapeShift] (May 2)

[https://shapeshift.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013876999-End-of-KeepKey-Chrome-App-Do-Not-Use https://shapeshift.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013876999-End-of-KeepKey-Chrome-App-Do-Not-Use] (Jun 4)

[https://shapeshift.com/library/shapeshift-security-update-keepkey-client-google-chrome ShapeShift Security Update: KeepKey Client] (Jun 4)

[https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepkey-client/idgiipeogajjpkgheijapngmlbohdhjg KeepKey Client - Chrome Web Store] (Jun 4)