KeepKey Attackable With Physical Access - Revision history

Azoundria at 19:21, 1 May 2023

2023-05-01T19:21:28Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:21, 1 May 2023
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	{{Imported Case Study\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyattackablewithphysicalaccess.php}}		{{Imported Case Study 2\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyattackablewithphysicalaccess.php}}
	{{Unattributed Sources}}		{{Unattributed Sources}}

	[[File:Keepkey.jpg\|thumb\|KeepKey]]With physical access to a KeepKey hardware wallet, it is possible to obtain the seed phrase from the device.		[[File:Keepkey.jpg\|thumb\|KeepKey]]With physical access to a KeepKey hardware wallet, it is possible to obtain the seed phrase from the device.

	This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.		This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.<ref name="shapeshift-7559" /><ref name="shapeshiftstoriesmedium-7560" /><ref name="ledgerblog-7601" />
	<ref name="shapeshift-7559" /><ref name="shapeshiftstoriesmedium-7560" /><ref name="ledgerblog-7601" />

	== About KeepKey ==		== About KeepKey ==
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	!Description		!Description
	\|-		\|-
	\|June 13th, 2019 ~~12:00:00 AM~~		\|June 13th, 2019
	\|Main Event		\|Main Event
	\|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.		\|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
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	\|		\|
	\|}		\|}

			== Technical Details ==
			This section includes specific detailed technical analysis of any security breaches which happened. What specific software vulnerabilities contributed to the problem and how were they exploited?

	== Total Amount Lost ==		== Total Amount Lost ==
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	== Ongoing Developments ==		== Ongoing Developments ==
	What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?		What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?
			== General Prevention Policies ==
			Adding a passphrase will encrypt the stored seed phrase. A longer pass phrase makes it harder for an attacker to extract the information.
			== Individual Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Individuals:Placeholder}}

			{{Prevention:Individuals:End}}

			== Platform Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Platforms:Placeholder}}

			{{Prevention:Platforms:End}}

			== Regulatory Prevention Policies ==
			{{Prevention:Regulators:Placeholder}}

	== Prevention ~~Policies ==~~		{{Prevention:Regulators:End}}
	~~Adding a passphrase will encrypt the stored seed phrase. A longer pass phrase makes it harder for an attacker to extract the information.~~

	== References ==		== References ==

Azoundria at 06:01, 21 February 2023

2023-02-21T06:01:21Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:01, 21 February 2023
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	{{Imported Case Study\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyattackablewithphysicalaccess.php}}		{{Imported Case Study\|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyattackablewithphysicalaccess.php}}
			{{Unattributed Sources}}

	[[File:Keepkey.jpg\|thumb\|KeepKey]]With physical access to a KeepKey hardware wallet, it is possible to obtain the seed phrase from the device.		[[File:Keepkey.jpg\|thumb\|KeepKey]]With physical access to a KeepKey hardware wallet, it is possible to obtain the seed phrase from the device.

	This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.		This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.
			<ref name="shapeshift-7559" /><ref name="shapeshiftstoriesmedium-7560" /><ref name="ledgerblog-7601" />

	== About KeepKey ==		== About KeepKey ==
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	Don't Include:		Don't Include:

	* Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.		* Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
	* Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.		* Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
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	\|-		\|-
	\|June 13th, 2019 12:00:00 AM		\|June 13th, 2019 12:00:00 AM
	\|~~First~~ Event		\|Main Event
	\|~~This is an expanded~~ description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.		\|Expand this into a brief description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
	\|-
	\|
	\|
	\|
	\|-		\|-
	\|		\|
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	== Total Amount Recovered ==		== Total Amount Recovered ==
	~~It is unknown how much was~~ recovered.		There do not appear to have been any funds recovered in this case.

	What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?		What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?
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	== References ==		== References ==
	[https://shapeshift.com/keepkey KeepKey - Hardware Wallet \| ShapeShift] (May 2)		<references><ref name="shapeshift-7559">[https://shapeshift.com/keepkey KeepKey - Hardware Wallet \| ShapeShift] (May 2, 2022)</ref>

	[https://medium.com/shapeshift-stories/responding-to-ledgers-2019-breakingbitcoin-findings-4213849a4fb Responding To Ledgers 2019 Breakingbitcoin Findings] (May 2)		<ref name="shapeshiftstoriesmedium-7560">[https://medium.com/shapeshift-stories/responding-to-ledgers-2019-breakingbitcoin-findings-4213849a4fb Responding To Ledgers 2019 Breakingbitcoin Findings] (May 2, 2022)</ref>

	[https://blog.ledger.com/Unfixable-Key-Extraction-Attack-on-Trezor/ Unfixable Seed Extraction on Trezor - A practical and reliable attack] (May 4)		<ref name="ledgerblog-7601">[https://blog.ledger.com/Unfixable-Key-Extraction-Attack-on-Trezor/ Unfixable Seed Extraction on Trezor - A practical and reliable attack] (May 4, 2022)</ref></references>

Azoundria: Created page with "{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyattackablewithphysicalaccess.php}} KeepKeyWith physical access to a KeepKey hardware wallet, it is possible to obtain the seed phrase from the device. This is a global/international case not involving a specific country. == About KeepKey == "The Next Frontier of Crypto Security. Protect your cryptocurrencies, store your private keys offline, and safeguard your a..."

2023-01-25T03:09:18Z

Created page with "{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyattackablewithphysicalaccess.php}} thumb|KeepKeyWith physical access to a KeepKey hardware wallet, it is possible to obtain the seed phrase from the device. This is a global/international case not involving a specific country. == About KeepKey == "The Next Frontier of Crypto Security. Protect your cryptocurrencies, store your private keys offline, and safeguard your a..."

New page

{{Imported Case Study|source=https://www.quadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/keepkeyattackablewithphysicalaccess.php}}

[[File:Keepkey.jpg|thumb|KeepKey]]With physical access to a KeepKey hardware wallet, it is possible to obtain the seed phrase from the device.

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

== About KeepKey ==
"The Next Frontier of Crypto Security. Protect your cryptocurrencies, store your private keys offline, and safeguard your assets from hackers. It’s time to achieve financial freedom in the most secure way with KeepKey."

"Hardware wallets (like KeepKey) are designed to protect you from the most common attack vectors: including malware, viruses, and remote hackers looking to steal private keys. But — the vulnerability that Guillemet and Ledger reference does not attack keys in these ways."

"Rather, this vulnerability is one in which an attacker would need to have physical possession of your KeepKey. KeepKey’s job is to protect your keys against remote attacks."

"If somebody else has physical access to your device — as well as the time, skill, and tools necessary — they will always be able to command the device to do whatever they want, bypassing any digital lock that exists."

"ShapeShift recommends that you secure your device with the same caution you would with other investments or valuables. Protect your KeepKey like it could be stolen tomorrow."

"While PIN codes add 4–9 simple digits to create a barrier between hackers and your private key(s), 9 digits aren’t enough. In his presentation, Guillemet demonstrated that you can guess a 9-digit PIN in approximately one minute."

"With KeepKey, you‘re able to set a passphrase that provides an added layer of protection."

"From our understanding, there’s no way to patch it, there is only one mitigation: the use of a long passphrase. In this context, as the seed itself can be considered as public, the passphrase should be long enough to prevent brute-force or dictionary attacks." "Guillemet recommends using passphrases comprised of at least 32 digits made up of a unique combination of numbers, symbols, as well as upper and lower-case letters."

"With a sufficiently-long passphrase, if an attacker takes the data off your device, they’ll never be able to unlock it. Your PIN and your passphrase keeps your funds — safe."

This is a global/international case not involving a specific country.

The background of the exchange platform, service, or individuals involved, as it would have been seen or understood at the time of the events.

Include:

* Known history of when and how the service was started.
* What problems does the company or service claim to solve?
* What marketing materials were used by the firm or business?
* Audits performed, and excerpts that may have been included.
* Business registration documents shown (fake or legitimate).
* How were people recruited to participate?
* Public warnings and announcements prior to the event.

Don't Include:

* Any wording which directly states or implies that the business is/was illegitimate, or that a vulnerability existed.
* Anything that wasn't reasonably knowable at the time of the event.
There could be more than one section here. If the same platform is involved with multiple incidents, then it can be linked to a main article page.

== The Reality ==
This sections is included if a case involved deception or information that was unknown at the time. Examples include:

* When the service was actually started (if different than the "official story").
* Who actually ran a service and their own personal history.
* How the service was structured behind the scenes. (For example, there was no "trading bot".)
* Details of what audits reported and how vulnerabilities were missed during auditing.

== What Happened ==
The specific events of the loss and how it came about. What actually happened to cause the loss and some of the events leading up to it.
{| class="wikitable"
|+Key Event Timeline - KeepKey Attackable With Physical Access
!Date
!Event
!Description
|-
|June 13th, 2019 12:00:00 AM
|First Event
|This is an expanded description of what happened and the impact. If multiple lines are necessary, add them here.
|-
|
|
|
|-
|
|
|
|}

== Total Amount Lost ==
The total amount lost is unknown.

How much was lost and how was it calculated? If there are conflicting reports, which are accurate and where does the discrepancy lie?

== Immediate Reactions ==
How did the various parties involved (firm, platform, management, and/or affected individual(s)) deal with the events? Were services shut down? Were announcements made? Were groups formed?

== Ultimate Outcome ==
What was the end result? Was any investigation done? Were any individuals prosecuted? Was there a lawsuit? Was any tracing done?

== Total Amount Recovered ==
It is unknown how much was recovered.

What funds were recovered? What funds were reimbursed for those affected users?

== Ongoing Developments ==
What parts of this case are still remaining to be concluded?

== Prevention Policies ==
Adding a passphrase will encrypt the stored seed phrase. A longer pass phrase makes it harder for an attacker to extract the information.

== References ==
[https://shapeshift.com/keepkey KeepKey - Hardware Wallet | ShapeShift] (May 2)

[https://medium.com/shapeshift-stories/responding-to-ledgers-2019-breakingbitcoin-findings-4213849a4fb Responding To Ledgers 2019 Breakingbitcoin Findings] (May 2)

[https://blog.ledger.com/Unfixable-Key-Extraction-Attack-on-Trezor/ Unfixable Seed Extraction on Trezor - A practical and reliable attack] (May 4)