$190 000 USD

APRIL 2024

GLOBAL

FENGSHOU (NGFS)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS

"Shortly after the deployment of the FENGSHOU (NGFS) token, it was attacked, resulting in a loss of approximately $191,000. The vulnerability lies in a public `delegateCallReserves` function which allows the attacker to set an arbitrary address to a UniSwapV2 proxy."

 

"The FENGSHOU (NGFS) Token was hacked shortly after deployment. The attack was a simple 3-step process which was possible because the deployer didn't initialize the contract properly.

 

1. The attacker called `delegateCallReserves` which sets the uniswapV2Proxy to msg.sender."

 

"2. Then it was easy for the attacker to set the `_uniswapV2Library` to any address he wants and to be able to call the third critical function."

 

"3. The `reserveMultiSync` allowed him to sync(transfer) all of the funds from the PancakeSwap BSC-USD - NGFS pool to his address. And just like that ~$191k has been affected."

 

"The data of the token and the pair are no longer updated as the token is SCAM" "Very high start liquidity, it looks like a scam!"

 

Explore This Case Further On Our Wiki

It is unclear the intent behind the launch of the NGFS (FENGSHOU) token, however it most likely wasn't to give an attacker full access to take all of the liquidity. A couple days after the token launched on April 23rd, an exploit took advantage of a delegateCallReserves vulnerability, which allowed the attacker to set whatever library smart contract he wanted, including a malicious one which transferred all the liquidity to themselves.

Sources And Further Reading

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