UNKNOWN

AUGUST 2020

GLOBAL

CHICK FINANCE

DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS

"Winner Winner Chicken Dinner!" "Audits: None. (This project is in beta. Use at your own risk.) Chicks farm will start on 2020/08/24 12:00:00 UTC+. At that time 25,000 CHICK will be released for each farm."

 

"Chick.Finance (CHICK) has a supply of 7500 CHICK and is distributed among a few addresses, so luckily it hasn’t succeeded in attracting many people, though it is worth saying that the website was created only last August 20th."

 

"Chicken.Finance [wa]s backdoored using Unicode trick (Pub1ic), which based on the function names, seems to be also trolling the DeFi space."

 

"Moreover, when checking the contract, there is no way of seeing it because it is blurred and it is no longer public."

 

"In short, all this suggests that it is a not very legitimate project."

 

"On August 24, the core developers of the YFII community audited the click.finance contract of the Vault machine gun pool alternative project and found that the contract code of the upcoming liquid mining project chick.finance was different from that shown in the GitHub warehouse. Modifer was malicious Modified to "pub1ic", the developer has the right to withdraw all tokens recharged by the user. This project has a fatal risk, please avoid participating. The YFII community reminds the majority of "farmers" to pay attention to risks when participating in liquid mining projects, and the safety of principal is the first."

 

"It INTENTIONALLY makes the modifier function as a “pub1ic!” to disguise itself as a “public” function, to easily rug pull."

 

"In fact, it is precisely in the smart contract that there is a particular error in the “modifier” function in line 350, which, instead of “public”, presents the words “pub1ic”, misleading users about the characteristics of this smart contract."

 

"The developer has made the following constraints on the deliberately misspelled pub1ic (that is, only the contract owner can call it. If there is no such call, then everyone can do it. The developer wants to steal it by himself, and definitely doesn’t want others to steal it. )"

 

"As if this wasn’t already strange and suspicious, when checking one of the transactions related to this address, it is possible to find out that the Tornado Cash system has been used to make it impossible to trace who is behind this system."

 

On "August 24, 2020, Chicken Finance owners stole deposits with a backdoor."

 

"This is such a malicious act please spread out word ASAP to your fellow farmers."

 

"Wtf it’s initialized funding/first farming staking (usually from the team itself) was from Tornado cash .. which means it INTENTIONALLY prepare to stay full anon to easily rug pull and scam the f out of all farmers .. "

 

"please help share and avoid degen farmers get rekt we need to keep at least scammer be exposed ASAP to keep degen game happy and lively .."

 

The website was modified to diaply the following on August 24th: "Fatal error in contract, REMOVE your tokens NOW!!! Final winner: 0xf1D8722b******8F2d9a4fb68aF0*****739318E !!! Reward: 10 CHICK. winter, winter, chicken dinner!!"

 

"A new problem afflicts DeFi, and in particular the Chick.finance project."

 

"YFII notified the risk of the chick.finance contract code, but the sentence "all tokens recharged by users, developers have the right to withdraw" is not completely accurate, so here we need Give everyone a more detailed description."

 

The problem with the malicious code of the contract is not that "the developer can extract the tokens in the user's contract after the incident" (the developer can do this in the first place), but that for any user authorized by the contract, the developer All the tokens in your wallet can be wiped out (not just what you deposit into the contract). This is exactly what Bitpie Security Lab mentioned in the previous article "The biggest security risk in the current Ethereum Defi ecosystem" To the "abuse of contract authorization issues."

 

"The logic of the above code is very simple. It is for users who have authorized this contract. The contract owner can transfer your tokens to the owner. It's that simple."

 

"This is actually a very serious vicious event in the DeFi ecosystem, which should attract the attention of the entire industry, because this time malicious developers may just use spelling mistakes to try to deceive everyone (write public as pub1ic), and then they were lucky for the first time. Found it, what about next time? Is it possible to write loopholes that are complicated in logic and hard to be seen, and wait quietly for the online to wipe out your wallets? It should be emphasized again that in this example, you lose not only the assets you deposited in the contract, but all the assets in your wallet, understand?"

 

"When we raised the issue of "abuse of contract authorization" to the entire industry, we expected that developers might do evil. We didn't expect this day to come so quickly. This time the code disguise is rather stupid. What about next time? ? Will the DeFi miners be able to avoid it next time?"

Not only was the Chick Finance team completely and deliberately anonymous, but they stored customer funds in a smart contract hot wallet which was deliberately backdoored in a very clever way. They were actually surprisingly honest on the site, stating there was no audit and to use the contract at your own risk.

 

Using a clever trick of replacing the lowercase "L" in public with a digit "1", they created source code that looked legitimate but actually enabled the theft of deposited funds. Since the "team" was completely anonymous, nothing was recovered.

HOW COULD THIS HAVE BEEN PREVENTED?

Having a norm of registered projects and making the process reasonable simple would remove the legitimate need and desire to have anonymous teams/founders.

 

Funds stored in smart contract hot wallets, in general, should have a contingency plan. Funds should be in offline cold storage whenever possible.

 

Check Our Framework For Safe Secure Exchange Platforms

Sources And Further Reading

 For questions or enquiries, email info@quadrigainitiative.com.

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